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6.1 Introduction
The United States and Canada share similar populations and similar mac-
roeconomic environments. Yet each has chosen a different set of policies to
address the problem of poverty. Canada has a tradition of universal non-
means-tested programs that is almost entirely absent in the United States. In
addition, Canada's means-tested programs maintain broader eligibility and
more generous benefit payments than those of the United States. Preliminary
evidence suggests that Canadian institutions have been more successful than
U.S. institutions in eliminating poverty: although the United States has
slightly higher average incomes than Canada, Canada has substantially lower
poverty rates of families with children. In 1986, the poverty rate of single-
parent families with children was 32.3 percent in Canada' compared to 45.3
percent in the United States; the poverty rate oftwo-parent families with chil-
dren was 5.2 percent in Canada and 6.8 percent in the United States. l
This paper examines the extent to which the differences in social welfare
institutions can explain the different poverty outcomes in the two countries.
In particular, we ask what would be the impact ofadopting Canadian antipov-
erty programs in the United States, and U.S. antipoverty programs in Canada.
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1. These are poverty rates for nonelderly families, based on the U.S. definition ofpoverty. See
section 6.3.1 for details on their computation.
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We simulate the potential impact of running Canadian transfer programs in
the United States and vice versa by applying institutional rules on program
eligibility and benefit levels to microdata from each country, allowing for a
range of labor supply and participation responses. We also use these simula-
tions to estimate participation rates among different population groups, and to
document the extent of regional variation in program generosity. This paper
focuses on program differences in 1986 between the United States and Can-
ada; a description of comparative poverty rates over time between these two
countries can be found in Hanratty and Blank (1992).
Our results indicate particularly dramatic differences in the impact of the
two systems on the poverty rates ofsingle parents with children. The poverty
rate of single-parent families would declin~ from 43 percent to 16 percent if
the United States adopted the "mean" Canadian program, assuming Canadian
participation rates were duplicated in the United States. Assuming 100 per-
cent participation rates, poverty among this group would nearly disappear.
These results are not very sensitive to a range ofassumed labor supply elastic-
ities.
Not surprisingly, our results also suggest that transfer expenditures would
increase substantially ifthe United States were to adopt the Canadian transfer
system. Our estimates imply that total U.S. transfer expenditures would be
two to three times higher under the Canadian transfer system, depending on
the assumed labor supply elasticities and participation rates.
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section describes the key
Canadian and U.S. social welfare programs. Because we were unable to find
a detailed comparison of these programs elsewhere in the literature, we in-
clude a lengthy description here. The reader who is primarily interested in the
simulation results may tum to table 6.1 for a quick summary of the transfer
programs and then skip to section 6.3. Section 6.3 presents information on
the demographic characteristics and income sources of families in the two
countries. Section 6.4 presents the simulation results. Section 6.5 summarizes
and concludes the paper.
6.2 Comparing Antipoverty Programs in the United States
and Canada
6.2.1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with transfer programs for nonelderly, nondisabled
individuals and families in the United States and Canada. Because of data
availability, we focus on the year 1986.2 The key programs that this paper
2. An extensive description of the legislative rules on eligibility and benefits by program and
across provinces was not available in Canada until 1985, with an update for 1986. See Canada
Department ofNational Health and Welfare (1986,1988).Table 6.1 Transfer Programs in 1986, Nonelderly, Nonhealth Related
(in 1986 U.S. dollars)
A. Canadian Transfer Programs
Unemployment insurance (UI)
Available to unemployed workers for at least 42 weeks. As provincial unemployment rises,
weeks rise to a maximum of 50 (received by most workers in 1986). Federal government
determines all eligibility rules and benefits. Replaces 60 percent of weekly earnings up to a
maximum of $396/week. Must have worked more than" 14 weeks in past year and/or earned
more than $74/week.
Family Allowance (FA)
Available to all families with children under 18; no means testing. Provides $303/child/year.
Two provinces have variations.
Social Assistance (SA)
Available to low-income families and inviduals. Eligibility and benefits determined and run by
province; grant levels, deductions, and tax rates vary widely by province. Grant supplements
often available "at discretion of local office." Work programs included in some provinces.
(Three provinces-Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Manitoba-have a "two-tier" system in which
the municipalities determine eligibility and benefit rules for particular groups of applicants.)
Population-weighted average provincial grant for single nondisabled individual with no count-
able income on long-term assistance is $266/month (lowest province is $171; highest province
is $524). For a single parent with two children it is $627/month (lowest province is $594;
highest province is $922).
Child Tax Credit (CTC)
Available to lower-income families with children under 18. Maximum credit of $363/year/
child. Available to all families with $18,800 or less income. Breakeven income level for a
household with one child is $26,064. Credit refundable to those without tax liabilities.
B. United States Transfer Programs
Unemployment Insurance (UI)
Available to unemployed workers for up to 26 weeks. (At very high state unemployment levels,
the federal extended benefit [EB] program supplements state programs with additional weeks
of benefits; only one state received EB in 1986.) Eligibility requirements as well as benefit
levels are set by the states and vary significantly. Most states have either minimum weeks or
minimum earnings requirements for eligibility. the population-weighted state average replace-
ment rate is 64.2 percent in 1986, with an average maximum benefit of $184/week. (Lowest
state is $115; highest state is $310.)
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
Primarily available to single-parent households, although some states allow two-parent house-
holds to receive AFDC, typically with stricter eligibility requirements. States set some eligi-
bility rules and set benefit levels. The federal government determines other eligibility rules and
sets the tax rate. A tax rate on earnings of 66 percent applies for the first four months of
recipiency and rises to 100 percent thereafter. The population-weighted state average benefit
for a family of one adult and two children with no countable income is $368/month. (Lowest
state is $118; highest state is $740. This is an outlier; the next highest state pays $583/month.)
Food stamps
An in-kind program that provides "coupons" that can be used to purchase food. Generally
agreed to be the equivalent of a cash grant for most recipient families. Eligibility and benefits
set at the federal level. Maximum food stamps available to a family of three with no countable
income is $211/month.
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
Available to low-income families with children under age 18 and with earned income. Does
not vary with family size. As earnings rise, credit increases to a maximum of $550 between
$5,000 and $6,500 in earned income, and then declines to zero at $11,000. Credit refundable
to those without tax liabilities.194 Rebecca M. Blank and Maria J. Hanratty
deals with are outlined in table 6.1. A history of the relevant legislative
changes in these programs from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s is provided
in appendix A.3
We do not include medical insurance programs in our analysis because
there is no information in our microdata for either the Vnited States or Canada
on medical needs or insurance usage. The result ofthis omission is to consist-
ently underestimate the extent of public assistance in Canada relative to the
Vnited States. Canada's national health insurance program covers the entire
population. In the Vnited States, insurance among the nonelderly is largely
privately provided by employers. Public medical assistance is available to
some low-income households through the Medicaid program, but 39.6 per-
cent ofpoor families in the United States are uninsured in 1986.4
All dollar values are denominated in V.S. dollars. To convert Canadian
dollars we use an index based on the 1985 DECO estimate of purchasing
power parity for consumption goods. 5 This measures the ratio of the number
ofCanadian dollars to U.S. dollars required to buy the same market basket of
goods in each country.
This paper uses data on the ten major Canadian provinces. In the Vnited
States, we include the fifty states and the District ofColumbia.
6.2.2 The Programs
Unemployment Insurance
Both Canada and the Vnited States operate unemployment insurance (VI)
programs that offer payments to individuals who have involuntarily lost their
jobs. In Canada, the VI program is a national program, available to most un-
employed workers.6 The weekly VI benefit is set at 60 percent ofthe average
weekly earnings during the weeks worked in the past twenty weeks, to a max-
imum of $396 per week. The duration of UI payments varies with both the
weeks worked in the previous year and the regional unemployment rate. In
1986, the maximum VI duration was fifty weeks in all provinces.
In the Vnited States, the VI program is entirely state run, which means that
program rules differ significantly across states. Most states have requirements
3. For a review of the existing literature on the economic and behavioral effects of transfer
programs, see Ismael (1987) or Vaillancourt (1985) for Canada and Danziger and Weinberg
(1986) for the United States. For a comparative discussion of historical poverty issues in both
countries, see Leman (1980).
4. See Chollett (1988). The Medicaid program in 1986 primarily covered families or individu-
als who were eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children or Supplemental Security
Income.
5. OECD (1987). This is adjusted to 1986 using the relative inflation rates based on the U.S.
GNP implicit price deflator for consumption and the Canadian GDP implicit price deflator for
consumption. This gives a conversion rate of 1.25 U.S. dollars per Canadian dollar in 1986.
6. Workers who have less than ten to fourteen weeks ofinsurable employment in the previous
year, or who work less than fifteen hours/week, or who earn less than 20 percent of maximum
weekly insurable earnings are not covered by the UI program.195 Comparison ofSocial Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
(stricter than those in Canada) that an individual work either a minimum num-
ber of weeks or earn a minimum amount on the job to qualify for UI. UI
payments on average are set at 64.2 percent of previous weekly earnings; the
maximum state payment averages $184/week. UI payments are available for
only twenty-six weeks in most states, as opposed to fifty in Canada. As a
result of these differences, a lower percentage of the unemployed receive UI
in the United States than in Canada: in 1986, 59 percent of the unemployed
received UI in Canada, while only 28 percent ofthe unemployed received UI
in the United States. 7
Public Assistance to the Poor
The primary means-tested assistance program in Canada is Social Assist-
ance (SA), which provides cash assistance to low-income families and indi-
viduals. This program is funded jointly by the federal and provincial govern-
ments, but it is run almost entirely at the provincial level. 8 Provinces set
eligibility standards and benefit levels, which vary widely.9 Unlike the United
States, this program does not exclude individuals from the program because
of their family composition. However, benefit levels do vary by family com-
position: the maximum payment for single individuals is $266/month, while
it is $627/month for a single parent with two children. 10
In the United States, assistance to the poor is divided between two pro-
grams: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and food stamps.
AFDC provides cash assistance to (primarily) single-parent families. II This
program is run jointly by the states and the federal government. AFDC maxi-
mum benefits in the United States are substantially lower than SA maximum
benefits for single-parent families in Canada. The population-weighted state
average maximum benefit for a single parent with two children is $368/month
in 1986, less than 60 percent ofCanada's level.
7. The U.S. figure is from Blank and Card (1991), while the Canadian figure is from Card and
Riddell (chap. 5 in this volume).
8. Federal regulations for SA under the 1966 Canada Assistance Plan impose two requirements:
provinces cannot impose residency requirements and eligibility must be based on a needs test
(rather than an income test). Quebec has opted out ofthe Canada Assistance Plan and runs its own
SA program, with special cost-sharing arrangements with the federal government.
9. In three "two-tier" provinces (Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Manitoba), SA benefits and eligi-
bility are determined at the municipal level for certain categories of recipients. In Ontario, for
example, municipal governments are responsible for all individuals who are determined to be
employable, while the provincial government provides support to those unable to work. The ben-
efit levels reported for municipally run programs refer to the largest city in the province.
10. We use the benefit levels provided by the Canada National Council ofWelfare (1987). The
levels we use assume that any single individual or two-parent family would be classified by the
province as employable, while single-parent families would be considered unemployable (except
in Alberta or British Columbia, where only single parents with extremely young children are
considered unemployable).
11. In 1986, twenty-eight states allowed some two-parent families to receive AFDC, although
eligibility standards were typically stricter. Over 90 percent of the AFDC caseload has always
been female-headed families. In 1990, all states were required to provide AFDC to eligible two-
parent households.196 Rebecca M. Blank and Maria J. Hanratty
The food stamp program provides monthly vouchers redeemable for gro-
cery items to low-income families and individuals. Food stamp benefits and
eligibility are entirely set at the federal level, with uniform national benefits.
In contrast to AFDC, food stamps are available to any household below a
certain income level, regardless of household composition. Thus single indi-
viduals or two-parent households who cannot receive AFDC can receive food
stamps. The maximum food stamp payment is $80/month for a single individ-
ual and $211/month for a family ofthree in 1986.
Tax Credits
In addition to cash and in-kind assistance, both countries also run tax cred-
its for low-income households with children. The Canadian Child Tax Credit
(CTC) is a refundable tax credit for families with children. The CTC provides
$363/year/child for households with annual incomes below $18,800, declin-
ing to zero at $26,064 in income.
The U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit avail-
able to working families with children. As earnings increase, the tax credit
increases to a maximum of$550 between $5,000 and $6,500 in earnings, and
declines to zero at $11,000. Unlike the CTC, the EITC is not prorated by the
number of children. In addition, families must have earnings in order to re-
ceive the EITC.I2
Universal Benefits
In Canada, there is one program that has no counterpart in the United
States. This is a universal benefit program for all families with children under
18, called Family Allowance (FA). FA is paid by the federal government and
provides $303/child/year to all Canadian families, regardless of income
level. 13
6.2.3 Institutional Differences in Canadian and U.S.
Antipoverty Programs
This section highlights some of the primary conceptual differences in the
way the U.S. and Canadian antipoverty programs are designed.
Program Extensiveness
Canada's safety net is far more extensive than the U.S. system, both in
population coverage and benefit levels. There are at least three dimensions of
comparison.
12. Other tax differences between the countries also clearly affect the well-being of the poor,
although these two tax credits are the primary piece ofthe tax system in each country designed to
assist only low-income households. For a fuller discussion of tax differences see Kesselman
(1992).
13. Quebec does not participate in the national FA program, but established its own system of
FA levels, which increase as family size rises. Alberta also runs a slightly altered FA program.197 Comparison of Social Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
First, there are differences in the extent of means testing between the two
countries. In Canada, there is a tradition ofuniversal social transfer programs,
along the model prevalent in many European countries. Thus, Canada runs a
universal health insurance program, a universal Old Age Security pension,
and provides universal per-child payments (FA) to all households with chil-
dren. Households receive similar benefits from these programs regardless of
their other income. In the United States, there are no purely universal pro-
grams; means testing occurs in every public program to at least some extent. 14
This tradition ofuniversal programs gives a flavor to Canadian discussions of
antipoverty policy that is not found in the United States. 15
Second, due to differences in categorical eligibility requirements, a greater
share ofsingle individuals and two-parent families are eligible for transfers in
Canada than in the United States. Although Canadian SA benefits and eligi-
bility vary significantly across household types, most provinces provide some
cash assistance to all households if they are poor enough. In contrast, cash
assistance in the United States is largely limited to single-parent families. 16
Third, Canada's programs generally have higher benefit levels. As table 6.1
indicates, both the average UI maximum weekly payment and the average SA
maximum payment are substantially higher in Canada than in the United
States. Even in the least-generous province in Canada, the SA benefit level
for single-parent families exceeds the maximum low-income transfers (AFDC
and food stamps) available in all states except Alaska.
Because of both the broader eligibility and greater generosity of the UI
system in Canada, this program is much more important as an antipoverty
program than in the United States. In Canada, most nonworking households
with an employable family member will receive UI rather than SA, so that
while the availability of SA to all household types suggests that this program
would be used more broadly than AFDC, in reality SA recipients tend to look
much more like AFDC recipients (women with small children orfamilies with
long-term employment problems) than the program rules suggest.
Program Control and Government Structure
Canada and the United States both have a federalist system ofgovernment,
in which legislative authority is shared between the federal and state govern-
14. For instance, although most U.S. workers are eligible for Social Security after retirement,
the amount received depends upon the level ofearnings.
15. For instance, in the United States one ofthe proposals often made by welfare reform advo-
cates is a minimum income program (negative income tax), which would provide similar levels of
economic support to all households below a given income level. Such a program was supported in
the recent U.S. Catholic Bishops' statement on economic justice. In contrast, the Canadian Bish-
ops released their own statement in 1988 in which they explicitly rejected a minimum income
program and called instead for full employment, coupled with improved social insurance and
extended universal services. Means-tested programs were criticized as divisive, stigmatizing the
poor (Canadian Conference ofCatholic Bishops, 1988).
16. Some states provide very limited cash assistance to single individuals through a program
known as General Assistance.198 Rebecca M. Blank and Maria J. Hanratty
ments. There are notable differences in the decision-making structure for so-
cial assistance programs in the two countries, however. The UI system is en-
tirely state-run in the United States, while it is a federal program in Canada.
By contrast, the SA program is largely controlled by the provinces in Canada,
while both states and the federal government determine AFDC rules in the
United States. Both countries divide the costs ofAFDC/SA programs between
the federal and state/provincial governments. While the federal government
establishes key categorical and financial eligibility criteria for the AFDC pro-
gram in the United States, however, the Canadian federal government exerts
almost no influence over eligibility rules or benefit criteria for the SA pro-
gram.
Canada's SA program also allows more discretion to caseworkers than does
the U.S. AFDC program. This occurs in part because little public information
is available on eligibility and benefit rules in Canada. For example, a full
description ofprovincial eligibility and benefit rules was not available in Can-
ada until 1986, whereas the U.S. federal government has been publishing de-
scriptions ofstate AFDC program rules for over two decades. 17 It also occurs
because SA program rules explicitly give greater discretion to the caseworker.
For example, SA benefit levels often depend on a detailed itemization of a
household's need for goods such as food, housing, or medical care. The SA
caseworker is in charge ofthis needs assessment, and can provide quite differ-
ent benefits to families of the same size in the same city, depending on such
things as their housing situation and the ages oftheir children.
This difference between the two systems is striking. Discretionary benefits
are almost inconceivable in the United States, where watchdog groups de-
mand that publicly known, uniform regulations be applied to all applicants.
In Canada, there appear to be greater trust in the decisions and competence of
government employees and a willingness to grant decision-making authority
to government caseworkers. 18
Work Incentives
Both the United States and Canada currently offer only modest financial
incentives for public assistance recipients to enter the work force. The U.S.
AFDC program disregards 33 percent ofearnings for the first four months on
welfare, but taxes earnings at 100 percent afterwards. Many states allow de-
ductions for transportation, child-care, or other work expenses, thus lowering
the effective tax rate. The U.S. food stamp program disregards 24 percent of
17. In the United States, there has been an ongoing public debate over whether individuals who
should receive assistance are being turned away and whether individuals who shouldn't receive
assistance are being accepted. Concern over both ofthese issues (often by quite different groups)
has created a demand for public information on AFDC regulations.
18. This is consistent with both Leman's (1980) and Lipset's (1990) argument that Canadians
are more deferential to authority, giving political leaders greater independence than in the United
States.199 Comparison of Social Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
earnings, after a standard deduction of $98/month plus deductions for child-
care, shelter costs, and medical expenses.
In Canada, as in the United States, financial work incentives in the SA
program are limited. In 1986, the provincial programs offered a mean earn-
ings deduction of $117/month plus a 12 percent disregard on any additional
earnings. However, there is substantial variability in financial incentives
across provinces. Earnings deductions vary from zero (Prince Edward Island)
to $224/month (Quebec). The additional tax rate on earnings ranges from 100
percent in five provinces to 70 percent (Manitoba). 19
Both Canada and the United States have moved toward combining job pro-
grams with welfare as an alternate method of encouraging work. 20 However,
the system of mandated work programs found in the United States is clearly
not yet acceptable in Canada: recently, the federal government aborted an at-
tempt by Alberta to mandate work for welfare. The federal government
claimed this plan violated federal regulations requiring provinces to assist all
families in need.
6.3 The Effect ofTransfers on Poverty
6.3.1 The Data
This section uses microdata from the United States and Canada to investi-
gate the role that transfer income plays in the economic well-being ofvarious
groups among the poor in each country. The U.S. data come from the March
1987 Current Population Survey (CPS), which provides information on in-
come and work behavior for over 50,000 families during 1986. The Canadian
data come from a very similar survey, the April 1987 Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF), which surveys over 30,000 families and asks about their in-
come and labor market experiences in 1986.
We use data for all families that are headed by an individual between the
ages of 18 and 60 who is neither retired, in school, or disabled. The resulting
samples contain 44,568 family observations for the United States and 22,074
family observations for Canada. (Throughout this paper, we use the wordfam-
ily to refer to single individuals living alone as well as related individuals
living together.)
In both countries, we use what Canada defines as "census families" rather
than "economic families." An economic family consists ofall related individ-
uals who live in the same household. A census family consists of all married
or single individuals and any unmarried children that live together. Thus, a
three-generation household will contain two census families but only one eco-
19. For further discussion ofthis issue, see Banting (1987) or the Evans and McIntyre article in
Ismael (1987).
20. See Gueron (1990) for a description ofU.S. programs.200 Rebecca M. Blank and Maria J. Hanratty
nomic family. We focus on census families because most transfer programs
determine eligibility and benefit levels at the census family level. In addition,
the formation ofeconomic families is typically assumed to be endogenous to
public assistance benefits; the lower are benefit levels, the more likely that
multiple census families will live together and pool income. 21
We compare income and poverty status across a variety of subpopulation
groups in the tables discussed below. We distinguish between households with
single and married heads, with and without children. We also distinguish be-
tween the poor, whose income falls below the official poverty line, the near
poor, whose income is between one and two times the poverty line, and the
upper income, whose income is over two times the poverty line. (Note that 70
percent of the population is included in the upper-income category for both
countries.) In addition, we look separately at the white, black, and Hispanic
populations in the United States and at the English- and French-speaking pop-
ulations in Canada.22
We calculate poverty rates using both the U.S. and Canadian definitions of
poverty. The U.S. poverty line is based on a 1964 calculation ofneed that uses
the cost ofa minimally adequate food budget as its basis. It varies with family
size. In contrast, the Canadian "low-income cutoff" measures the average in-
come level at which a family spends more than 58.5 percent of their income
on food, clothing, and shelter. It varies with family size and city size. 23 Ap-
pendix table 6B.l presents the U.S. poverty thresholds and the Canadian low-
income cutoffs for 1986 in U.S. dollars. The Canadian poverty thresholds lie
uniformly above the U.S. thresholds. A family of four is considered poor in
the United States at $11,203, while the equivalent low-income cutoffin a large
urban area in Canada is $17,330.
Table 6.2 provides information on the comparative populations in the
United States and Canada. The primary message oftable 6.2 is that these two
countries have similar populations with respect to demographic and household
characteristics. In fact, within groups that have higher average incomes, there
are almost no notable differences. There are three areas of difference, how-
ever, noticeable among lower-income households. First, Canadians have
fewer female households heads. Only 47 percent of Canadian poor families
21. We experimented in some initial calculations with the economic family definition rather
than the census family definition and found results that were largely comparable to those reported
here; poverty counts were slightly lower in both countries, with the United States being more
affected. In both countries, official poverty counts are based on economic families and thus will
differ from our calculations.
22. The SCF in Canada has no information on racial or ethnic background. The English- and
French-speaking populations are identified by a question that asks about the mother tongue of a
family. Twelve percent of the Canadian population identifies a language other than English or
French as their mother tongue. In the tabulations along this dimension, this group is excluded.
23. See Ruggles (1990) for a full description ofhow the U.S. poverty line has been calculated;
see Wolfson and Evans (1989) for a description of how the Canadian low-income cutoffs are
calculated.201 Comparison ofSocial Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
Table 6.2 Population Comparisons, United States versus Canada, 1986
Total Population Poor Near Poor Upper Incomea
U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada
Population (%) 100.0 100.0 13.5 11.8 16.7 18.2 69.8 70.0
Married (%) 55.3 61.8 21.9 28.2 46.7 51.3 64.0 70.2
Years ofeducationb 13.0 12.5 11.3 11.4 12.0 11.8 13.6 12.9
Age ofhead 37.6 37.7 32.6 35.7 34.8 35.9 39.3 38.4
Working heads (%) 91.4 90.1 59.7 49.8 92.6 87.1 97.5 97.7
Female heads (%)C 29.5 21.1 62.0 46.7 36.5 29.0 21.4 14.8
Persons in household 3.0 2.9 3.5 2.8 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.8
Families in household 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
Single, No Single, Married, No Married,
Children Children Children Children
U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada
Population (%) 32.5 32.5 12.2 7.3 21.1 18.8 34.2 41.4
Married (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Years ofeducationb 13.2 12.7 12.0 12.0 13.0 12.4 13.1 12.5
Age ofhead 35.5 35.1 33.1 36.5 44.3 40.5 37.1 38.6
Working heads (%) 91.7 87.1 72.3 68.9 93.8 92.1 96.6 95.4
Female heads (%)C 46.8 45.4 88.2 86.9 7.7 0.0 5.6 0.0
Persons in household 1.9 1.8 3.6 2.9 2.5 2.1 4.2 4.0
Families in household 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
Note: Based on census families, heads aged 18-60.
aBased on U.S. poverty lines.
bThe Canadian data reports education only in discrete intervals. Shown are interpolated midpoints. In
addition, Ontario requires thirteen years for high school graduation, whcih increases the difficulty of
comparing years ofeducation between Canada and the United States.
cIn Canada, ifa male adult is present, he is considered the household head, therefore no married couples
are female-headed. In the United States, the household head is self-reported.
are female-headed, in contrast with 62 percent ofU.S. poor families. Second,
Canadians have fewer families per household and fewer persons per house-
hold, particularly among the poor and among single parents with children.
This may reflect the lower levels of public assistance in the United States,
which are likely to lead more nuclear (census) families to live together and
pool income. Third, fewer Canadian households are working than in the
United States, particularly in lower-income households. In part, this reflects a
higher unemployment rate in Canada in 1986. 24 It may also reflect more gen-
erous transfer income payments, which allow families to survive without
earnings.
24. Canada's unemployment rate for civilian workers was 9.5 percent in 1986, while the U.S.
unemployment rate was 7.0 percent.202 Rebecca M. Blank and Maria J. Hanratty
6.3.2 Income Sources and Poverty Rates in the United States and Canada
Table 6.3 shows how income sources and total incomes compare in the
United States and Canada, by household composition and by income group.
We highlight four major issues.
First, while Canada's average total income is lower than that ofthe United
States,25 disadvantaged groups have higher incomes in Canada than in the
United States. Poor families have average total incomes of$4,921 in Canada,
while they have incomes of$4,789 in the United States; income levels among
the near poor are also very similar in each country. Single-parent families have
higher incomes in Canada than in the United States. In analysis not shown
here, we also verify that income among the French-speaking minority in Can-
ada is only slightly lower than among the English-speaking majority. In con-
trast, income among nonwhites in the United States is far below that of
whites.
Second, the principal reason for higher total income among disadvantaged
groups in Canada is highertransfer income. Poor, near-poor, and single-parent
family earnings are no higher in Canada, but transfers are substantially higher.
In fact, all groups of Canadians receive more transfer income; on average
Canadians receive 6.0 percent of their income from government transfers,
while Americans receive only 2.4 percent.
Third, single-parent families have remarkably similar earnings levels in
both countries. This finding is ofinterest since, as we shall verify below, these
families are major users of public assistance in both countries. Thus, there
seems to be little evidence in these initial tabulations to suggest that the more
generous SA program in Canada has caused more single-parent families to
drop out ofthe labor force. In fact, among the poor in each ofthe four house-
hold types shown at the bottom of table 6.3, it is poor single-parent families
who are most similar in their work behavior in both countries.
Table 6.4 shows the percentage ofpoor, near poor, and upper income, using
both the U.S. and the Canadian definitions of poverty for each population
subgroup. 26 We also present a poverty gap measure based on the U.S. poverty
line. The poverty gap is defined as the average difference between the income
ofthe poor and the poverty line. Whereas the poverty rate measures the num-
ber of individuals below a fixed line, the poverty gap measures how far on
25. Note that these tables compare the pretax, posttransfer income levels of both countries.
Since Canada has more extensive transfer payments on average, it also is likely to have higher
taxes. Thus, ifone were to compare the posttax and posttransfer income distributions, one would
likely find even greater differences in average income.
26. In tabulating household income in tables 6.4 and 6.5, we include CTC income for Canadian
households that report receiving it, but we exclude the EITC among U.S. households because we
have no reported data on EITC receipt. Table 6.3 indicates that simulated EITC amounts (which
assume 100 percent take-up) are extremely small. In the simulations that follow, the simulated
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Table 6.3 Income Sources, United States versus Canada, 1986 (in 1986 U.S. dollars)
Total Population Poott Near Poott Upper Incomea
U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada
Earnings 28,292 23,884 2,592 1,950 11,655 9,880 37,237 31,432
Head 21,401 18,217 2,210 1,729 9,665 8,368 27,916 23,714
Spouse 5,445 4,874 259 177 1,535 1,236 7,383 6,657
Government transfers 730 1,622 1,818 2,731 912 2,349 477 1,236
AFDC/SA 172 358 987 1,824 195 538 10 51
FA 249 233 318 233
Food stamps 86 504 90 4
UI 241 730 125 389 288 1,056 252 707
Total income 30,978 26,877 4,789 4,921 13,370 12,989 40,251 34,398





U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada
Earnings 18,199 13,846 10,734 10,770 40,043 29,241 36,868 31,659
Head 17,066 13,846 9,857 9,343 25,720 19,580 26,960 22,604
Spouse 11,598 9,661 8,753 7,392
Government transfers 446 1,006 2,064 3,073 592 1,366 610 1,967
AFDC/SA 49 340 1,014 1,673 12 187 88 217
FA 2 418 2 525
Food stamps 27 447 9 59
UI 180 418 126 526 293 827 308 969
Total income 20,217 15,796 14,239 15,296 43,973 32,672 39,130 35,000
Tax creditb 98 389 23 246
Note: Based on census families, heads aged 18-60.
aBased on U.S. poverty lines.
bSince there is no information on EITC in the U.S. CPS, this is imputed assuming a 100 percent take-up
rate. The Canadian CTC is based on reported data. Tax credits are not included in total income.
average most individuals are below that line, providing a measure of well-
being among the poor.
Vsing the V.S. definition of income, table 6.4 indicates that the overall
poverty count is 13.5 percent for the United States, while it is 11.8 percent in
Canada. In Canada, however, the percentage that is near poor is greater than
in the United States, so that the percentage ofupper income is virtually iden-
tical in the two countries. The poor in Canada also have substantially smaller
poverty gaps than in the United States among every group in table 6.4, imply-
ing that poverty is not only lower but that it is also less extreme in Canada.
Single individuals in Canada and married couples without children have204 Rebecca M. Blank and MariaJ. Hanratty
Table 6.4 Income Needs, U.S. versus Canada, 1986 (in 1986 U.S. dollars)
Total Population Canada-Language U.S.-Race
U.S. Canada English French White Black Hispanic
U.S. poverty definition
Poor (%) 13.5 11.8 10.8 14.2 9.9 30.2 25.3
Near poor (%) 16.7 18.2 17.6 19.2 14.8 22.4 28.1
Upper income (%) 69.8 70.0 71.5 66.6 75.3 47.3 46.6
Poverty gapa
Poor 3,702 2,528 2,644 2,042 3,479 4,107 3,867
Canadian definition
Poor (%) 20.6 18.3 16.5 21.8 15.7 41.2 40.2
Near poor (%) 26.2 30.0 29.2 31.1 25.4 28.2 31.8
Upper income (%) 53.2 51.7 54.3 47.1 58.8 30.7 28.0
Single, No Single, Married, Married,
Children Children No Children Children
U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada
U.S. poverty definition
Poor (%) 15.5 19.9 45.3 32.3 2.8 4.1 6.8 5.2
Near poor (%) 18.4 22.0 24.4 28.8 7.8 9.4 17.9 17.3
Upper income (%) 66.0 58.1 30.3 38.8 89.5 86.5 75.3 77.5
Poverty gapa
Poor 3,017 2,341 4,172 2,519 3,374 2,430 4,152 3,142
Canadian definition
Poor (%) 23.1 28.8 59.0 47.7 5.5 6.7 13.8 10.2
Near poor (%) 26.8 29.8 25.8 33.3 15.2 17.7 32.6 35.0
Upper income (%) 50.0 41.3 15.2 19.0 79.3 75.5 53.6 54.8
Notes: Based on census families, heads aged 18-60.
Poor is below poverty line; nearpoor is between one and two times poverty line; upper income is greater
than two times poverty line.
aThe poverty gap is defined as the average difference between the incomes of the poor and the poverty
line. We report estimates based on the U.S. poverty line.
uniformly higher poverty and near-poverty counts than in the United States.
Single parents, however, are much less likely to be poor in Canada; the pov-
erty rate among this group is 32 percent in Canada, while it is 45 percent in
the United States.
Table 6.5 investigates the extent to which government transfers move fam-
ilies out of poverty, by comparing poverty rates based on pretransfer family
income with poverty rates based on total (posttransfer) family income. Of
course, this only approximates the effect of transfers, since it assumes that
transfers do not affect other sources of income. If transfers cause families to
work less, table 6.5 will overestimate the extent of pretransfer poverty that
would result in the absence oftransfers.205 Comparison ofSocial Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
Table 6.5 Pre- versus Posttransfer Poverty, Using U.S. Poverty Definitions, 1986 (in
1986 U.S. dollars)
Total Population Canada--Language U.S.--Race
U.S. Canada English French White Black Hispanic
Poor (%)
Pretransfer 15.4 17.5 15.8 21.9 11.5 33.3 28.8
Posttransfer 13.5 11.8 10.8 14.2 9.9 30.2 25.3
Difference 1.9 5.7 5.0 7.7 1.6 3.1 3.5
Poverty gap
Pretransfer 5,255 4,825 4,774 4,975 4,627 6,376 5,886
Posttransfer 3,702 2,528 2,644 2,042 3,479 4,107 3,867
Difference 1,553 2,297 2,130 2,933 1,148 2,269 2,019
Single, No Single, Married, No Married,
Children Children Children Children
U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada
Poor (%)
Pretransfer 17.4 26.1 50.5 46.6 3.7 7.5 8.2 10.2
Posttransfer 15.5 19.9 45.3 32.3 2.8 4.1 6.8 5.2
Difference 1.9 6.2 5.2 14.3 0.9 3.4 1.4 5.0
Poverty gap
Pretransfer 3,561 3,817 6,953 6,584 3,802 4,227 5,342 5,619
Posttransfer 3,017 2,341 4,172 2,519 3,374 2,430 4,152 3,142
Difference 544 1,476 2,781 4,065 428 179 1,190 2,477
Note: Based on census families, heads aged 18-60.
Table 6.5 indicates that the Canadian transfer system is substantially more
effective than the U.S. transfer system in raising people out ofpoverty. Cana-
da's overall pretransfer poverty rate is about 2 percentage points higher than
the United States', but its posttransfer poverty rate is 2 percentage points
lower. This pattern is particularly strong for families with children: transfers
reduce poverty rates of single-parent families by 14 points in Canada as op-
posed to 5 points in the United States, and they reduce poverty rates of two-
parent families with children by 5.0 points in Canada as opposed to 1.4 points
in the United States. Even more striking is the impact on poverty gaps: trans-
fers reduce the poverty gap of single-parent families by 62 percent in Canada
as opposed to 40 percent in the United States.
The results of this section indicate that Canadian families on average are
worse offthan U.S. families in terms oftotal income, but that the poverty rate
and poverty income gap is lower in Canada, indicating that the poorest in
Canada are better off than in the United States. Much of this difference is due
to a more extensive government transfer system. Single individuals and mar-
ried couples without children have both lower incomes and higher poverty206 Rebecca M. Blank and Maria J. Hanratty
rates in Canada than in the United States; however, the more extensive Cana-
dian transfer system substantially moderates these differences. Single parents
with children are strikingly better off in Canada than in the United States.
They start out with more income before transfers and receive extensive trans-
fer assistance, leading to much lower poverty rates.
6.4 Simulating the Effects ofAntipoverty Programs
Section 6.3 indicates that the Canadian transfer system is apparently more
effective than the U.S. system in moving families out ofpoverty. However, it
is possible that this difference results from differences in the pretransfer in-
come distributions across the two countries rather than from differences in
transfer program rules. For example, if the income levels of the pretransfer
poor are closer to the poverty threshold in Canada than in the United States,
then the same level oftransfer payments could have a greater impact on pov-
erty in Canada.
In this section, we measure the impact of the transfers more direct!y, by
conducting simulations of the transfer systems in each country. We address
three issues: First, what are the estimated take-up rates for each ofthe transfer
programs in the two countries? Second, how does transfer-program generosity
vary across states and provinces in each country? Third, what would be the
impact on poverty rates and program costs of implementing Canadian anti-
poverty programs in the United States and vice versa?
6.4.1 Simulation Methodology
To simulate the impact of Canadian and U.S. transfer programs, we apply
state- and province-specific eligibility and benefit rules to microdata from
each country to estimate transfer eligibility and benefits among a random
sample of the population. We use the published sources listed in appendix C
to determine program parameters. This appendix also includes a detailed de-
scription ofour simulation methodology. Our microdata sources are the March
CPS for 1987, and the April SCF for 1987, described above. As noted before,
we restrict our sample to families that are headed by an individual between
the age of 18 and 60 who is not retired, in school, or disabled.
The most difficult program to simulate with our data is the UI program. In
both countries, UI benefits and eligibility depend upon the average weekly
earnings and the duration of employment during a base period prior to the
unemployment spell. Unfortunately, our data contain information about em-
ployment and earnings for only one year (1986) and not for the complete base
period. In fact, if an individual began a spell ofunemployment at the start of
the calendar year, we would not observe any data from their base period. We
proxy base period earnings and employment with reported weekly earnings
and weekly hours of work while employed in 1986. This is at best a rough
approximation, since, for many individuals whose unemployment spell oc-207 Comparison of Social Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
curred early in 1986, this means using data from employment spells that oc-
curred after the unemployment spell rather than before it. 27
A second area ofconcern is the accuracy ofour simulated estimates for the
SA program. As discussed above, eligibility and benefit levels in the SA pro-
gram are not as standardized as in AFDC. This makes it difficult to duplicate
the SA benefit and eligibility determination process faced by any particular
family. We use provincial information on the benefits available to a typical
family, which may be inaccurate for some households.
Appendix D contains a comparison of simulated and reported income
sources for eachofthe transfer programs included in the simulation and a brief
discussion ofthe accuracy ofthe simulation. This analysis shows a fairly high
degree of consistency between reported and simulated benefits. For the UI
programs in both countries, the simulation classifies between 85 and 95 per-
cent ofthe cases correctly. For other programs, the range ofcorrect estimates
falls within the 90th percentile.
In sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3, we present results from our base simulations,
which assume 100 percent participation and zero labor supply responses. In
sections 6.4.4 and 6.4.5, we present a range ofestimates that allow for varia-
tion in participation rates and labor supply elasticities.
6.4.2 Estimated Take-up Rates in U.S. and Canadian Transfer Programs
In table 6.6, we present estimates of the take-up rates for each of the key
transfer programs in both countries. The take-up rate is defined as the ratio of
the number of families who reported positive transfer incomes to the number
who had either simulated or reported transfer income greater than zero.28 It is
intended to measure the share of eligible families who participate in transfer
programs. This number will be a biased estimate ofthe true participation rate
ofeligible families to the extent that transfers are underreported in our micro-
data and that our simulations inaccurately predict eligibility. Since the under-
counts of both AFDC and SA income in our microdata are sizable,29 the low
27. Average weekly earnings received after a spell ofunemployment may tend to be lower than
those reported in the base period, during which a worker was continuously employed on his orher
previousjob. This could lead us to underestimate VI eligibility and benefits levels. However, since
we know nothing about the duration of previous employment and do not impose any restrictions
on VI eligibility based on this duration, we may overestimate eligibility.
28. The take-up rates in table 6.7 are calculated as the ratio
(Sim > 0, Actual> 0) + (Sim = 0, Actual> 0)
(Sim > 0, Actual > 0) + (Sim > 0, Actual = 0) + (Sim = 0, Actual > 0)'
where the numerator is the share ofthe population who report receiving transfers, and the denom-
inator is the share ofthe population either simulated to be eligible or actually receiving transfers.
Note that one could estimate an alternative take-up rate that excluded the "errors" in the simulation
(Sim = 0, Actual> 0) from both numerator and denominator. These alternative take-up rates are
slightly lower than those reported here, but the relative patterns across groups and programs are
largely identical.
29. The SCF documentation for 1987 indicates that the undercount is fairly small for the CTC
(4 percent) and the FA program (6 percent). It reports undercounts of47 percent for SA and other208 Rebecca M. Blank and MariaJ. Hanratty
Table 6.6 Estimated Take-up Rates
U.S. Canada
Unemployment Food Unemployment Family Social Tax
Insurance Stamps AFDC Insurance Allowances Assistance Credit
Total population 57.9 46.1 74.5 81.9 97.4 59.5 88.8
Single, no children 51.0 34.2 73.2 54.7
Single, children 45.0 60.3 71.6 79.0 97.6 71.1 88.8
Married, no children 62.5 30.9 82.6 74.1
Married, children 63.4 40.5 69.7 86.3 97.3 51.4 88.9
Poott 37.9 45.6 72.5 74.3 95.9 58.4 94.9
Near poott 51.2 41.6 81.6 80.3 97.2 54.2 89.5
Upper incomea 65.4 83.6 97.5 87.7
White 60.0 39.6 72.1
Black 48.9 60.6 80.2
Hispanic 52.3 46.2 70.3
English 79.2 97.5 53.5 90.6
French 87.9 97.4 76.8 88.2
Note: Take-up rates calculated as the ratio of all those who receive income from a program, divided by
all those who either are estimated as eligible and/or receive income from a program.
aBased on U.S. poverty lines.
estimated take-up rates in both programs are at least partially explained by
underreporting oftransfer income.
The first point to notice in table 6.6 is that take-up rates in most programs
are well below 100 percent. Estimated take-up rates for the Vnited States
range from a low of46 percent for the food stamp program,30 to 58 percent for
the VI program,31 to 75 percent for the AFDC program.32 In Canada, the SA
program has a low take-up rate of 60 percent, while the VI take-up rate is
higher at 82 percent. Canada's CTC and FA program have high participation
rates of89 percent and 97 percent, respectively.
Second, it is evident from table 6.6 that there is no consistent pattern be-
tween program generosity and benefit levels. The take-up rate in Canada's VI
program is 82 percent, while the take-up rate for the less-generous VI program
provincial assistance programs, and 22 percent for the UI program. In 1983, the U.S. CPS under-
count was 24 percent for UI and 24 percent for AFDC (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current
Population Reports, Series P-60, no. 103).
30. Our estimated 46 percent participation rate in food stamps is not too far from the GAO
estimate (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1988b, fig. 2. 1) of44 percent for 1986. Both ofthese
estimates are lower than a variety ofestimates derived from studies done in the late 1970s. For a
summary ofthese, see U.S. General Accounting Office (1988a), table 2.2.
31. This estimate for the United States is below the estimated take-up rate for UI in 1986 of
67.3 percent by Blank and Card (1991) and probably reflects the less adequate data available for
our eligibility imputations. We do not know ofany existing estimate ofCanadian UI take-up.
32. These take-up rates for AFDC are quite close to other estimates for earlier in the 1980s by
Ruggles and Michel (1987), who estimate an AFDC participation rate of78 percent for 1984.209 Comparison ofSocial Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
in the United States is 58 percent. By contrast, the estimated take-up rate for
SA is lower than the estimated take-up rate for AFDC, even though SA is a
substantially more generous program than AFDC. This result is not surpris-
ing, since the correlation between take-up rates and benefit levels is deter-
mined by two conflicting relationships: as benefits increase, more individuals
will participate in the program; however, as more individuals participate in the
program, program administrators may cut back on benefits.
An alternative way of investigating the relationship between take-up rates
and benefit levels is to look at the correlation across more and less generous
states and provinces. In the United States, the correlation coefficient between
the AFDC benefit level in a state and our estimated state take-up rate is
O. 152. 33 The correlation between state maximum UI benefit levels and state-
specific UI take-up rates is 0.359. In Canada, the correlation coefficient be-
tween the SA benefit level for single parents and the estimated provincial take-
up rate for SA is - 0.591.34 None of these results provide strong support for
the theory that higher take-up rates occur in more generous programs.
6.4.3 Simulation Results for U.S. and Canadian Programs
Table 6.7 presents the results from our base simulations, which assume zero
labor supply responses and 100 percent participation rates. For each simula-
tion, table 6.7 reports total family income, the percentage ofincome received
from government transfers, the share offamilies receiving each type oftrans-
fer, the estimated dollars received, and the resulting poverty count and pov-
erty gap. The top of the table shows a series of simulations on U.S. data and
the bottom shows a series ofsimulations on Canadian data.
Column 1shows actual transfers reported in the CPS or the SCF. Column 2
shows simulated transfers, estimated using the mean (population-weighted)
U.S. program parameters for U.S. microdata and mean Canadian parameters
for Canadian microdata. These results are almost identical to simulations that
apply the rules specific to each state or province. Thus, we do not present
these latter simulations here.
For the United States, simulated average total income is $31,134, with 2.8
percent from transfers. This is only slightly above the reported average in-
come of $30,998. The biggest effect of the simulation is to double the share
of the population receiving food stamps, from 7.6 percent (reported) to 14.7
33. There is a lot ofnoise in the state estimates oftake-up rates, because of small numbers of
observations in low-population states. This would tend to reduce the correlation coefficient. The
state sample ranges from 354 observations (Wyoming) to 4,077 (California), but a much smaller
number in each state are estimated to be eligible for any of the programs. The province sample
ranges from 596 observations (Prince Edward Island) to 4,128 (Ontario).
34. The negative relationship between benefit levels and participation rates in Canada may be
related to program structure: in Canada's SA program, provinces can choose both eligibility rules
and benefit levels. Thus, provinces may choose to restrict eligibility for SA, in order to give out
more generous benefits. Ifwe imperfectly simulate these eligibility restrictions in our microdata,
we may report lower participation rates in the more generous provinces.210 Rebecca M. Blank and Maria J. Hanratty
Table 6.7 Simulation Results, Total Population (in 1986 U.S. dollars)
u.s. Programs Canadian Programs
Actual Meana Highb Lowe Meana Highb Lowe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
U.S. data
Income ($) 30,998 31,134 31,236 31,012 31,792 31,965 31,531
Government transfers (%) 2.4 2.8 3.2 2.5 4.9 5.4 4.1
Receiving (%)
Food stamps/FA 7.6 14.7 14.4 14.7 46.4 46.4 46.4
AFDC/SA 5.1 4.5 6.8 3.4 13.2 14.4 9.9
UI 11.8 14.5 15.1 15.4 13.6 13.6 13.6
EITC/CTC 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 21.7 21.7 21.7
Received ($)
Food stamps/FA 1,132 1,260 902 1,495 554 554 554
AFDC/SA 3,356 3,663 5,123 1,321 4,586 5,414 3,463
UI 2,045 1,963 1,728 1,614 2,397 2,397 2,397
EITC/CTC 293 293 293 293 575 575 575
Poor, U.S. definition (%) 13.2 12.6 11.5 12.6 6.1 5.5 11.3
Poverty gap 3,683 2,767 1,957 3,411 1,618 1,567 2,301
Canadian Programs U.S. Programs
Actual Meana Highb Lowe Meana Highb Lowe
Canadian data
Income ($) 26,877 27,069 27,198 26,833 26,318 26,270 26,206
Government transfers (%) 6.0 6.7 7.1 5.9 4.0 3.9 3.6
Receiving (%)
FA/Food stamps 43.6 43.3 43.3 43.3 14.6 14.6 14.8
SA/AFDC 8.7 12.8 13.6 13.6 0.3 0.3 0.1
UI 23.8 20.5 20.5 20.5 21.6 22.2 22.2
CTC/EITC 23.6 18.7 18.7 18.7 5.5 5.5 5.5
Received ($)
FA/Food stamps 570 559 559 559 1,409 1,399 1,415
SAlAFDC 4,131 4,028 4,765 2,976 2,726 4,582 897
UI 3,070 3,270 3,270 3,270 2,545 2,234 1,991
CTC/EITC 553 526 522 526 289 289 289
Poor, U.S. definition (%) 11.8 8.8 8.3 12.9 13.4 13.4 13.6
Poverty gap 2,528 1,770 1,704 2,468 3,422 3,398 3,415
aBased on population-weighted average state/province program rules.
bBased on Vermont program rules for the United States and Saskatchewan rules for Canada.
eBased on Alabama program rules for the United States and New Brunswick rules for Canada.211 Comparison of Social Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
percent (simulated). This reflects the low estimated take-up rates for food
stamps among eligible families. (Recall that these initial simulations assume
100 percent participation.) Because of the higher transfer income levels, the
simulated poverty rate is 0.6 points lower than the reported poverty rate of
13.2, and the poverty gap is over $900 smaller than the reported gap of
$3,683. In Canada, the results ofusing simulated rather than reported income
are similar in magnitude: the share of government transfers rises from 6.0 to
6.7 percent, the poverty rate (U.S. definition) falls from 11.8 to 8.8 percent,
and the poverty gap falls by about $750.
To document the range ofvariation in transfer programs within each coun-
try, we apply the rules from the most generous state or province, and those
from the least generous state or province to the entire country. These results
are shown in columns 3 and 4. In the United States, we use the programs from
Vermont (most generous) and Alabama (least generous),35 while in Canada,
we use Saskatchewan (most generous) and New Brunswick (least generous).36
Ofcourse, the results from these simulations cannot be interpreted literally
as the expected results of such a legislative change, since the only variables
that are allowed to change in the simulations are government transfer income.
If individuals decrease their labor supply in response to an increase in trans-
fers, these simulations will overstate the impact ofmoving to a more generous
program. These simulations do, however, provide an indication ofthe magni-
tude ofvariation between antipoverty programs.
Our simulations suggest that, if the United States adopted the Vermont
transfer system (and no other income sources changed), poverty would fall
from 12.6 percent (as simulated on mean U.S. programs) to 11.5 percent and
the poverty gap would fall by $810. Ifit adopted the Alabama transfer system,
poverty would remain at 12.6 percent, but the poverty gap would increase by
$644.
Similar simulations suggest that ifCanada were to adopt its most generous
provincial program, poverty rates would decrease from 8.8 to 8.3 percent and
the poverty gap would decrease slightly. If it adopted its least generous pro-
vincial program, poverty would increase to 12.9 percent and the poverty gap
would increase substantially. While the most generous Canadian program re-
35. We select these states on the basis of AFDC maximum benefit payments. Vermont is used
as the most generous state, even though Alaska has a substantially higher AFDC benefit level,
because Alaska's level is so far above all other states that it is perhaps best treated as an outlier. It
is important to note that these are not the most and least generous states with respect to VI pay-
ments, although Vermont is among the more generous VI states and Alabama is among the least
generous VI states. A clear ranking of VI generosity would be difficult to determine among V.S.
states, since states set both eligibility criteria and benefit levels. In a number of states, broader
eligibility is offset by lower maximum benefit limits or vice versa.
36. These provinces are ranked on the basis of payments to single parents. New Brunswick is
also the least generous to married couples and is the second least generous to single individuals
(Quebec pays less). Saskatchewan is also most generous for married couples but ranks in the
middle with regard to generosity to single individuals.212 Rebecca M. Blank and MariaJ. Hanratty
sults in poverty counts in that country well below the U.S. poverty counts, the
least generous provincial program results in Canadian poverty counts that are
quite comparable to those in the United States.
These results suggest that program variation has a more dramatic impact on
poverty rates in Canada than in the United States: there is a 4.6-point differ-
ence in poverty rates between the best and worst Canadian simulation, but
only a 1. I-point difference between U.S. simulations. This is because Cana-
da's most generous province has benefit levels high enough to bring a large
share ofthe poorover the poverty line, while no U.S. states have benefit levels
high enough to have a sizable impact on poverty. Thus, although AFDC ben-
efit levels vary far more than Canadian SA benefit levels in percentage terms,
variations in AFDC benefit levels have a much smaller impact on poverty.
Columns 5-7 investigate the effect ofapplying the mean Canadian program
rules in the United States, and the mean U.S. program rules in Canada. Note
that in comparing the impact ofmoving from one country's transfer system to
the other's, the appropriate comparison is between the simulated impact ofthe
new program and the simulated impact ofthe existing program. In both coun-
tries the effect is dramatic. In the United States, shifting from the mean U.S.
plan to the mean Canadian plan would reduce the poverty rate from 12.6 per-
cent to 6.1 percent and decrease the poverty gap from $2,767 to $1,618. Even
the least generous provincial transfer system achieves a lower poverty rate
than the most generous U.S. state transfer system, although the poverty gap
would be somewhat higher. If the United States adopted Saskatchewan pro-
grams, poverty rates would plummet to 5.5 percent, and the poverty gap
would fall to $1,567. Thus, the Canadian provincial programs appear to pro-
vide substantially greater transfer income and have much stronger antipoverty
effects than any existing U.S. state programs.
In Canada, application of U.S. programs has the opposite effect. Poverty
rates rise and government transfers fall. The best U.S. transfer system, from
Vermont, produces a poverty rate and poverty gap lower than in the least gen-
erous province, but well below the mean ofCanadian programs.
Table 6.8 examines how these results vary among different subgroups in the
United States; table 6.9 repeats this analysis for Canada. The most striking
result in table 6.8 is the dramatic impact ofCanadian programs on the poverty
rates of single-parent families with children. This is of particular interest,
given the enormous public concern in the United States with the high poverty
rate of these families. As table 6.8 shows, under the mean U.S. program the
simulated poverty rate for single-parent families is 43 percent and the poverty
gap is $2,628. Even if all states adopted the generous transfer programs of
Vermont, the poverty rate would decrease to only 36 percent, although the
poverty gap would fall to $1,293. In contrast, the simulated effect ofthe Ca-
nadian programs on this group is astounding. The average Canadian transfer
program would decrease poverty to 2.4 percent. Ifthe generous Saskatchewan
plan were implemented, poverty among single-parent families would almost213 Comparison of Social Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
Table 6.8 Simulation Results, U.S. CPS Data (in 1986 U.S. dollars)
U.S. Programs Canadian Programs
Actual Meana Highb Lowe Meana Highb Lowe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Poor (%) 13.2 12.6 11.5 12.6 6.1 5.5 11.3
Poverty gap 3,683 2,767 1,957 3,411 1,618 1,567 2,301
Single, no children
Poor (%) 15.5 15.2 15.2 15.2 15.3 15.3 15.3
Poverty gap 3,017 2,597 2,586 2,571 1,710 1,591 2,513
Single, children
Poor (%) 43.7 43.4 36.5 43.4 2.4 0.1 34.5
Poverty gap 4,197 2,628 1,293 4,197 691 811 1,859
Married, no children
Poor (%) 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6
Poverty gap 3,374 2,731 2,714 2,651 1,835 1,368 3,009
Married, children
Poor (%) 6.5 5.4 4.7 5.4 0.9 0.0 4.5
Poverty gap 4,040 3,627 1,627 3,609 661 179 2,568
White
Poor (%) 9.7 9.2 8.3 9.2 5.2 4.8 8.1
Poverty gap 3,457 2,647 1,967 3,070 1,600 1,548 2,256
Black
Poor (%) 29.7 28.8 26.5 28.7 10.9 9.3 25.9
Poverty gap 4,101 2,933 1,988 3,971 1,745 1,678 2,377
Hispanic
Poor (%) 24.7 23.5 21.9 23.4 8.9 7.2 21.8
Poverty gap 3,834 2,950 1,856 3,757 1,478 1,473 2,340
aBased on population-weighted average state/province program rules.
bBased on Vermont program rules for the United States and Saskatchewan rules for Canada.
eBased on Alabama program rules for the United States and New Brunswick rules for Canada.
disappear, to less than 1percent. This is because the Canadian transfers avail-
able to single women with children are large enough to bring these families
up to the U.S. poverty line, assuming that all eligible persons participated.
Because participation rates on these programs are substantially below 100
percent, expected poverty rates among female-headed families may be higher,
as the analysis in section 6.4.4 indicates. These simulations also do not
include any labor supply responses; however, the analysis in section 6.4.4
indicates that these results hold for a wide range of assumed labor supply
elasticities. Moreover, as our data in table 6.2 indicate, since the earnings of
single-parent families in Canada are quite comparable to those of families in
the United States, there is little evidence that transfer programs have induced
large reductions in work effort in Canada.214 Rebecca M. Blank and Maria J. Hanratty
Table 6.9 Simulation Results, Canadian SCF Data (in 1986 U.S. dollars)
Canadian Programs U.S. Programs
Actual Meana Highb Lowe Meana Highb Lowe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Poor (%) 11.8 8.8 8.3 12.9 13.4 13.4 13.6
Poverty gap 2,528 1,770 1,704 2,468 3,422 3,398 3,415
Single, no children
Poor (%) 19.9 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.4 21.4
Poverty gap 2,341 1,814 1,730 2,692 2,870 2,856 2,840
Single, children
Poor (%) 32.3 3.1 2.8 33.0 40.2 38.8 40.4
Poverty gap 2,519 1,911 1,440 1,607 4,380 4,369 4,493
Married, no children
Poor (%) 4.1 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.1 5.2 5.2
Poverty gap 2,430 2,083 1,658 3,402 3,098 3,074 3,038
Married, children
Poor (%) 5.2 1.7 0.4 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.5
Poverty gap 3,142 828 1,186 2,317 3,926 3,894 3,854
English
Poor (%) 10.8 7.4 7.1 11.4 12.1 12.0 12.2
Poverty gap 2,644 1,710 1,650 2,323 3,320 3,296 3,320
French
Poor (%) 14.2 12.2 11.2 16.6 16.9 16.9 17.1
Poverty gap 2,042 1,846 1,771 2,623 3,594 3,570 3,571
aBased on population-weighted average state/province program rules.
bBased on Vermont program rules for the United States and Saskatchewan rules for Canada.
eBased on Alabama program rules for the United States and New Brunswick rules for Canada.
Our simulations also indicate that Canada's programs would have a sizable
impact on the poverty rates of two-parent families with children. Moving
from the mean program in the United States to the mean program in Canada
would decrease the two-parent family poverty rate from 5.4 points to 0.9
points, while the poverty gap would decrease from $3,627 to $661. Under
Canada's best provincial plan, the poverty rate would decrease to 0.0 percent
and the poverty gap would decline to $179.
Note that, while there is a dramatic difference in the simulated impact of
U.S. and Canadian programs on families with children, the differences for
two-parent families without children and single individuals are fairly small.
Moving from the mean U.S. to the mean Canadian program has a negligible
impact on poverty rates for single individuals and two-parent families without
children, although the poverty gap does decrease. This reflects the lower level
oftransfer assistance available to these groups in both countries.
The results in table 6.9, which are based on the Canadian population, gen-215 Comparison ofSocial Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
erally mirror the effects discussed above. This is not surprising, given the
similarities ofthe U.S. and the Canadian populations.
6.4.4 Adjusting for Labor Supply Responses and Program Participation
The above analysis assumes 100 percent participation rates and zero labor
supply responses. In this section, we estimate the impact on the U.S. popula-
tion of moving from the current V.S. programs to the mean Canadian pro-
gram, allowing for a range oflabor supply elasticities and for incomplete pro-
gram participation. This enables us to test whether our results are robust to
other behavioral assumptions.
We compare estimates of U.S. poverty rates and poverty gaps with Cana-
dian programs, assuming 100 percent program participation and assuming
lower participation rates. In the latter case, we use the estimated participation
rates by family type for Canada shown in table 6.6 and assume these same
participation rates would occur in the Vnited States ifthe Canadian programs
were adopted. As discussed above, observed participation rates should pro-
duce overestimates ofpoverty rates, due to underreporting oftransfer income.
To simulate the potential changes in work effort that may result from adopt-
ing the average Canadian means-tested programs, we use a range of income
and substitution elasticity estimates from the Seattle-Denver negative income
tax experiments reported in Keeley (1981).37 To simulate the impact of
changes in the VI system, we rely on estimates from the VI duration litera-
ture. 38 We assume that the change in labor supply induced by the change in
transfer systems is small enough that wages in the low-wage labor market
remain relatively constant. Thus, we use the current wage as a measure ofthe
wage that would prevail under the new transfer system. Our methodology for
these labor supply and program participation adjustments is explained in more
detail in appendix E.
The results, shown in table 6.10, indicate that our poverty rate estimates
and poverty gap estimates are surprisingly robust to the impact of changing
labor supply elasticities. For all family types, the impact of different labor
supply elasticities is quite small. The participation rate assumptions appear to
have a larger impact: using Canadian participation rates rather than assuming
100 percent participation increases the estimated V.S. poverty rate under the
Canadian system from 6 percent to 9 percent for all families, and from 2 per-
cent to 16 percent for single-parent families. Note, however, that the estimated
reduction in poverty from adopting the Canadian system is still substantial:
poverty rates ofall families decline from 13 percent under the V.S. programs
to 9 percent under the Canadian programs, while poverty rates for single-
37. The low-, medium-, and high-income and substitution elasticities for annual hours worked
for male heads are (.04, - .14), (.12, - .21), and (.30, - .30); for wives they are (.18, - .14),
(.24, - .24), and (.67, - .77); and for female heads they are (.07, - .13), (.17, - .24), and
(.36, - .80). These elasticities are larger than those presented in Moffitt and Kehrer (1981).
38. We use estimates from Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) and Katz and Meyer (1990).216 Rebecca M. Blank and MariaJ. Hanratty
Table 6.10 Simulated Impact in the United States ofMean Canadian Program
under Range ofLabor Supply Elasticities and Participation Rates
100% Participation Estimated Take-up Ratesb
Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty
Elasticitiesa Rate Gap Rate Gap
All families
Low 6.2 1,624 9.4 3,162
Medium 6.2 1,641 9.5 3,171
High 6.3 1,698 9.5 3,197
Single, no children
Low 15.4 1,713 16.0 2,521
Medium 15.5 1,733 16.2 2,522
High 15.5 1,800 16.2 2,548
Single, children
Low 2.4 702 15.8 3,911
Medium 2.5 693 15.9 3,952
High 2.5 701 16.2 3,989
Married, no children
Low 2.6 1,862 2.7 3,767
Medium 2.5 1,912 2.8 3,756
High 2.8 1,978 2.8 3,731
Married, children
Low 0.9 666 5.1 4,050
Medium 1.0 665 5.1 4,065
High 1.1 669 5.0 4,104
aSee footnote 37 for assumed elasticities for high, medium, and low cases.
bEstimated take-up rates are based on estimates for Canada reported in table 6.6.
parent families decline from 43 percent to 16 percent. The poverty rate oftwo-
parent families decreases more moderately. This is in part because the greater
generosity of the Canadian programs is offset by the lower participation rate
in SA than in AFDC for this group.
6.4.5 Expenditures under V.S. and Canadian Transfer Systems
Given the substantial differences in the simulated impact of the V.S. and
Canadian transfer systems on poverty, it is of interest to ask how program
expenditures would differ under the two systems. While it is difficult to esti-
mate the total increase in spending under each program since we have little
information on administrative expenditures, we can calculate the total cost of
transfer payments. As before, it is more appropriate to compare results from
different simulations, rather than to compare simulated with actual expendi-
tures. However, actual expenditures are included for the reader's interest.
Table 6.11 presents the total transfer spending under each ofthe simulations
discussed above. For each simulation, we estimate spending assuming 100217 Comparison ofSocial Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
Table 6.11 Change in U.S. Transfer Spending under Mean Canadian Program
(in billions ofdollars)
Reported V.S. expenditures =
$35.9 billion
Simulated V.S. expenditures with
V.S. programs



















aTake-up rates for Canadian programs based on estimated Canadian participation rates reported
in table 6.6. Take-up rates for V.S. programs based on actual participation, reported in the
microdata.
bSee footnote 37 for assumed elasticities for high, medium, and low cases.
percent take-up rates, and we recalculate spending using the take-up rates
prevalent in each country, which are shown in table 6.6.39 We present esti-
mates for a range oflabor supply responses to the change in welfare policy.
With full participation, the simulated cost ofU.S. benefit payments for the
U.S. population would be $46.6 billion; Canadian transfer programs would
cost from $91.0 billion to $109.6 billion, or about 2.0 to 2.4 times the cost of
U.S. programs. At current take-up rates, in contrast, the cost ofthe Canadian
programs would range from $67.9 billion to $81.1 billion, or about 2.4 to 2.9
times the cost ofcurrent U.S. programs.
In evaluating the impact of this increase in expenditures, two points are
important. First, to evaluate the impact ofthese programs on family incomes,
one must consider both the additional transfers and the additional taxes gen-
erated by the program. For example, the net impact of the FA program on
most families may be minimal, since they will receive an increase both in
taxes and in transfers as a result of the program. In table 6.12, we present
some simple calculations that are illustrative of the change in the posttax,
posttransfer income distribution that might result from moving to the Cana-
dian programs. We assume that all non-UI programs are financed by a propor-
tional increase in the federal income tax. We ignore any deadweight loss that
may result from the additional taxes. We do not attempt here to examine the
39. Table 6. 11 uses the estimated take-up rates for existing programs to estimate expected costs
in new programs, even though the benefit and eligibility rules change across programs. This is
clearly inaccurate, but unfortunately we have no information on how take-up rates might change
as program parameters change. For this reason, looking at the relative cost differences between








Change in U.S. Taxes and Transfers under Mean Canadian Program
by Family Income Quintile
Change in Transfers
Average Change in Change in
UI ($) Non-UI ($) Tax Rate Taxes ($) Income ($)
225.5 1,731.4 0.000 0.0 1,956.9
105.9 316.8 0.035 91.4 331.3
78.9 164.2 0.067 273.4 -30.3
46.0 108.9 0.090 511.2 -356.3
32.5 68.2 0.156 1,512.9 -1,412.2
Notes: This table provides an estimate ofthe change in taxes and transfers resulting from a change
from the mean U.S. to the mean Canadian transfer program, assuming observed U.S. and Cana-
dian participation rates and zero labor supply adjustments. We assume that all non-UI transfers
are financed by a proportionate increase in the income tax, and we ignore any deadweight loss
resulting from change in taxes or transfers. All dollar values presented in annual per capita basis.
Quintiles represent ranking of pretransfer, pretax incomes divided by poverty level. Average tax
rate information is drawn from U.S. House ofRepresentatives (1990). This source gives average
tax rates by posttransfer rather than pretransfer income distribution. However, in only 3 percent
ofthe cases do families change rankings when moving from pretransfer to posttransfer definition.
This source reports a negative tax rate for the bottom quintile, due to the EITC. We assume that
the tax rate for this group is zero, because we have already accounted for the EITC in our
simulations.
distribution of taxes resulting from the change in the VI program; the inci-
dence ofthese taxes is beyond the scope ofthe current study.
Columns 1 and 2 of table 6.12 represent the increase in VI and non-VI
transfers ranked by pretransfer family income quintiles.40 Column 3 indicates
average income tax rates by income quintile. 41 Column 4 represents the
change in taxes resulting from the program, and column 5 represents the
change in income.
This table clearly shows that the net income gains from these programs are
concentrated among the bottom quintile offamilies: the bottom two quintiles
have increases in average posttax, posttransfer incomes of $1,957 and $331,
respectively, while the top quintiles have net income declines. This table also
suggests that the increase in VI expenditures is more evenly spread across the
income distribution than the increase in the non-VI programs is.
The second point to consider in evaluating the impact ofthe additional ex-
penditures is the efficiency costs ofraising the additional tax revenue needed
to finance the programs. In this case, the total rather than the net increase in
40. We divide pretransfer family incomes by the poverty level, to adjust for family size. These
computations assume the observed participation rates by family type in the United States and
Canada, and zero labor supply response.
41. The effective tax rates are reported in U.S. House of Representatives (1990), table 99 for
the year 1985, and are based on the Congressional Budget Office Tax Simulation Model. They are
based on posttransfer rather than pretransfer income quintiles. However, in our sample the pre-
and posttransfer income quintiles are quite similar: only 3 percent ofall families shifted quintiles
as a result oftransfers.219 Comparison ofSocial Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
expenditures is the relevant metric, because this indicates the extent to which
marginal tax rates will have to be altered to raise additional revenue. The
excess burden can be substantial. Forexample, Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley
(1985) estimate that the deadweight loss ofraising an additional dollar oftax
revenue can range from $0.33 to $0.48. This would imply an excess burden
from the increased taxation of 0.3 percent to 0.7 percent of GNP, assuming
estimated take-up rates.42
6.5 Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that the Canadian transfer system is far more
extensive than the U.S. system. It offers both higher benefit levels and broader
eligibility than the U.S. system. As a result, Canadian transfer programs offer
far more protection against poverty. Our simulations suggest that the Canadian
system would generate substantially lower poverty rates and lower poverty
gaps in the United States than the current U.S. system.
The primary group that would benefit from the adoption of the Canadian
antipoverty system is families with children. Our simulations suggest that
poverty among both single-parent and two-parent families with children
would decline dramatically ifthe United States adopted the average Canadian
antipoverty transfer program. This result is striking, given the enormous pub-
lic concern in the United States over the high poverty rates of children. Our
simulations further indicate that this change would increase program expend-
itures: total U.S. transfer spending would increase by two to three times under
the mean Canadian transfer program.
There are limits to the extent to which such cross-country comparisons pro-
vide useful policy information. The substantially more costly Canadian pro-
grams may be entirely infeasible in the U.S. political context. In addition,
Canada has a system of antipoverty programs; transplanting only some parts
of that system to another country may produce very different results. At a
minimum, however, the results of this paper indicate that there is nothing
inherently unchangeable in the current poverty rates among women and chil-
dren in the United States. They are, at least in part, a result of the policy
choices that we have made. Canada's different choices have produced different
results.
The discussion in this paper has suggested a variety of avenues for further
research. A primary question is why Canada and the United States have
adopted such different transfer systems. The Canada-U.S. case is interesting,
because it appears to contradict standard theories that hold that regional con-
trol of welfare programs should lead to underprovision of welfare benefits.43
42. Note that, to compute the total excess burden of the program, one would also have to
consider the impact ofthe additional transfer payments.
43. See Brown and Oates (1987) for a summary ofthis literature.220 Rebecca M. Blank and Maria J. Hanratty
As noted above, this does not appear to be the case in Canada, since the Ca-
nadian SA program is both more decentralized and more generous than the
U.S. AFDC program.
In addition, it would be ofinterest to exploit the variation in program rules
across the two countries to study the behavioral effects of transfer programs.
For example, while the AFDC program imposes the same tax rate across all
U.S. states, tax rates vary substantially across provinces under the SA pro-
gram. One could examine whether these different tax rates have caused differ-
ent labor supply responses across Canadian provinces. Alternatively, one
could test whether the different treatment of one- versus two-parent families
in the two countries has had a significant effect on family formation. These
studies would provide an interesting supplement to the wide variety of such
studies in the United States focusing on AFDC.
Appendix A
Chronology ofSelected Social Service Legislation
Canada
1966 Canada Assistance Plan. Created the current system of Social Assist-
ance programs within the provinces.
Medical Care Act. Established national health insurance.
1971 Unemployment Insurance Act. Extended coverage from 80 to 96 per-
cent of the labor force. Reduced required weeks of covered employ-
ment for eligibility. Increased maximum benefits from 50 to 75 per-
cent of average earnings for persons with dependents and from 40 to
66 percent for persons without dependents.
1973 Family Allowance Act. Replaced previous family assistance program
and youth allowance act, and created the Family Allowance program.
Set monthly payments at $12 per child in 1973 and $20 per child in
1974. Provided for indexation offamily allowance benefit to inflation
using the CPl.
1975 Unemployment Insurance Amendments. Reduced maximum unem-
ployment insurance benefit to 66 percent ofearnings.
1977 Amendments. Increased weeks ofemployment required to qualify for
UI from 8 to between 10 and 14 weeks, depending on the regional
unemployment rate. Maximum benefit duration decreased from 51 to
50 weeks.
1978 Unemployment Insurance Amendments. Required 20 weeks of em-
ployment in prior year for new entrants to labor force. Required
higher entrance requirement for repeaters (one additional week of
covered employment for each week ofbenefits received up to a maxi-
mum of20 weeks). Maximum benefits reduced from 66 to 60 percent.221 Comparison of Social Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
Child Tax Credit. Established refundable national income tax credit
for families with children.
Family Allowance Amendment. Reduced monthly family allowance
rate for 1979 to $20 per child from $25.68 in 1978. Retained annual
escalation from 1979 onward.
1982 Family Allowance Amendment. Limited indexation of family allow-
ances.
1986 Family Allowance Amendment. Further limited indexation of family
allowances.
Source: Health and Welfare Canada 1987.
United States
1964 Food Stamp Act. Established national food stamp program, with op-
tional state participation.
1965 Medicaid Act. Established public health insurance for AFDC recipi-
ents.
1967 Aid for Families with Dependent Children Amendments. States must
disregard the first $30 of earnings and one-third of the remainder in
determining benefit levels.
1970 Unemployment Insurance Amendments. Provided a federal extended
benefits program for workers who exhaust state unemployment insur-
ance benefits in states with high insured unemployment rates. Ex-
panded coverage ofthe unemployment insurance system.
1971 Food Stamp Amendments. Required benefits large enough to pur-
chase nutritionally adequate diet. Established national eligibility stan-
dards.
1972 Supplemental Security Income Program. Replaced programs for fed-
eral/state old-age assistance, aid to the blind, and aid to the perma-
nently and totally disabled.
1973 Food Stamp Amendments. Expanded food stamp program. Provided
for semiannual adjustment of food stamp allotments. Broadened
classes ofpeople eligible.
1975 Earned Income Tax Credit. Established for working families with
children.
1976 Unemployment Insurance Amendments. Extended unemployment in-
surance coverage to state, local, and nonprofit employees.
1977 Food Stamp Amendments. Eliminated purchase requirement, so fam-
ilies received only bonus portion of coupon at no cost. Eligibility
standards tightened.
1978 Unemployment Insurance Amendments. Provided for federal taxation
ofunemployment insurance benefits.
1980 Food Stamp Amendments. Benefits updated on annual rather than
semiannual basis. Restricted eligibility ofstudents.
1981 Major Transfer Reductions. Limited $30 and one-third income disre-
gard under AFDC program to four months. Set eligibility cap on gross222 Rebecca M. Blank and MariaJ. Hanratty
income, at 150 percent ofstate-determined standard ofneed. Limited
total assets to $1 ,000.
Gross income eligibility limit established for food stamp program.
Earnings deduction lowered to 18 percent. Postponed increases in
benefit levels until October 1982.
Decreased income deductions for supplemental security income pro-
gram, from $60 of earned and unearned income and $195 of earned
income to $20 and $65, respectively.
Eliminated the national trigger in the extended benefits program of
unemployment insurance. Prohibited payment ofextended benefits to
an individual with fewer than 20 weeks ofwork in base period.
1984 Aid to Families with Dependent Children Amendments. Gross in-
come cap on eligibility raised to 185 percent ofstate standard ofneed.
$30 disregard extended from four to twelve months. States must dis-
regard first $50 ofchild-support collections per month.
1988 Family Support Act. Required all states to establish Aid to Families
with Dependent Children programs for eligible two-parent families.
Required all states to run education, training, and employment pro-
grams for work-eligible AFDC recipients, with mandatory participa-
tion.
Sources: u.s. House of Representatives 1990; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
1988; U.S. Department ofLabor 1986.
Notes: The U.S. CPS data do not contain information on city size. All calculations in this paper
that apply the Canadian low-income cutoffs to U.S. data collapse the five-city size breakdowns
into three categories. All U.S. individuals reporting that they live in an SMSA are given a low-
income cutoff based on the mean ofthe two largest city size categories. All individuals reporting
that they do not live in an SMSA but are not on a farm are given a low-income cutoff based on
the mean of the third and fourth largest city size categories. All individuals on farms are given
the rural low-income cutoff.223 Comparison ofSocial Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
Appendix C
Calculating Simulated Government Transfers on U.S.
and Canadian Data
Simulating U.S. Programs
Food Stamps. Rules for food stamp eligibility and benefit levels are taken from
U.S. House ofRepresentatives (1986), appendix G. Separate calculations are
made for Alaska and Hawaii, where program rules vary.
AFDC. Rules for AFDC need standards and benefit maximums by family size
by state, and state rules for payment of benefits are from the U.S. House of
Representatives (1986), section 8. Eligibility is determined by whether total
family income is less than 1.85 times the state need standard. AFDC for eli-
gible two-parent households is calculated in the states that allow such pay-
ments. Benefit amounts are adjusted for child-support deductions (allowable
up to $600/year), based on reported child-support income. Benefits also ad-
justed by earnings deductions, including the deduction for work expenses of
up to $625/year and the standardized earnings deduction of $30/month. Be-
cause we have no information on how long a recipient has been in the pro-
gram, we use the 100 percent tax rate for earnings, which is effective after
four months on the program.
Unemployment Insurance. Information on waiting periods, minimum and
maximum earnings limits, and minimum and maximum benefit payments
were provided by Blank and Card (1991), who collected this information from
the U.S. Department ofLabor, Comparison ofState Unemployment Insurance
Laws (various years). Maximum duration is set to twenty-six weeks except for
Massachusetts and Washington, which have a duration of thirty weeks, and
Alaska, which is on the federal extended benefits program and has a maxi-
mum of thirty-nine weeks. Replacement rates are calculated for each state as
the average of the ratio of minimum benefits to minimum earnings and the
ratio ofmaximum benefits to maximum earnings. Separate calculations on UI
eligibility and benefits are made for both head and spouse (ifpresent) for each
household in the simulation.
EITC. Rules for the EITC taken from the U.S. House of Representatives
(1986), section 10.
Simulating Canadian Programs
Family Allowance. Information on eligibility and benefit levels from Canada
Department of National Health and Welfare (1986, 1988), chapter 3. Alter-224 Rebecca M. Blank and Maria J. Hanratty
native calculations are made for Alberta and Quebec, where provincial varia-
tions in the program occur.
Social Assistance. Provincial rules for eligibility and benefit payment deter-
mination are from the Canada Department of National Health and Welfare
(1986, 1988), chapter 4. Benefit levels for nondisabled single individuals
(employable), nondisabled married couples with children (employable), and
nondisabled single parents with children (nonemployable) were taken from
Canada National Council of Welfare (1987), table 5. See that publication for
the assumptions by which these benefit levels were developed. Benefit levels
for other family sizes were interpolated as follows: We have information
on benefits for a single individual (B1), a single parent with one preschool
child (B2), and a married couple with two school-age children (B3). We
assume benefits for single-parent families are equal to B2 + (Number ofchil-
dren - 1) * (B3 - B2)/2. We assume benefits for married families are equal
to B3 + (Number ofchildren - 2) *(B3 - B2)/2. These linear interpolations
are probably least accurate for large families. The Work Income Supplement
Program in Quebec is included as part ofSA for the province, as is the Family
Income Plan for Saskatchewan and the Child-Related Income Support Pro-
gram for Ontario. The Work Incentive Program for Ontario is not included,
since the 1985 data indicate less than 2 percent ofthe caseload participates in
this program.
Unemployment Insurance. The eligibility, duration, and benefits information
for VI in Canada is taken from the Canada Department ofNational Health and
Welfare (1986, 1988), chapter 8. Durations by province are based on 1986
unemployment rates in each province. Separate calculations on VI eligibility
and benefits are made for both head and spouse (ifpresent) for each household
in the simulation.
Child Tax Credit. Rules for calculating eligibility and tax credit amounts de-
scribed in the Canada Department of National Health and Welfare (1986,
1988), chapter 3.
Appendix D
Comparing Simulated andReported Transfer Income
Table 6D.1 compares our 1986 simulations with the reported income sources
in our microdata. We report cases where our simulations agree with reported
benefits (Sim > 0, Actual> 0; Sim = 0, Actual = 0) and cases where our
simulations do not agree with reported benefits (Sim > 0, Actual = 0; Sim225 Comparison ofSocial Safety Nets in Canada and the U.s.
Table 6D.l Accuracy ofSimulations
u.s. Canada
UI benefits
Percentage (sim > 0, actual> 0) 6.0 15.3
Percentage (sim = 0, actual = 0) 79.6 70.9
Percentage (sim > 0, actual = 0) 8.6 5.2
Percentage (sim = 0, actual> 0) 5.8 8.5
Minimum percentage correct 85.6 86.2
Maximum percentage correct 94.2 91.4
Actual/simulation (sim > 0, actual> 0) ($) 1.39 1.53
AFDC/SA benefits
Percentage (sim > 0, actual> 0) 3.3 6.3
Percentage (sim = 0, actual =0) 93.1 85.4
Percentage (sim > 0, actual = 0) 1.8 5.9
Percentage (sim = 0, actual> 0) 1.8 2.4
Minimum percentage correct 96.4 91.7
Maximum percentage correct 98.2 97.6
Actual/simulation (sim > 0, actual> 0) ($) 1.24 2.09
Food stamps/FA benefits
Percentage (sim > 0, actual> 0) 5.9 42.1
Percentage (sim > 0, actual> 0) 83.6 55.2
Percentage (sim > 0, actual = 0) 8.8 1.2
Percentage (sim = 0, actual> 0) 1.7 1.5
Minimum percentage correct 89.5 97.3
Maximum percentage correct 98.3 98.5
Actual/simulation (sim > 0, actual> 0) ($) 1.04 .99
EITC/CTC
Minimum percentage correct n.a.a 89.0
Maximum percentage correct 92.0
Actual/simulation (sim > 0, actual> 0) ($) 2.66
aThe data contain no information on actual receipt ofthe EITC in the United States.
= 0, Actual> 0). We also report the ratio of reported to simulated benefits
among the subgroup ofindividuals who have both nonzero simulated and non-
zero reported transfers.
There are three reasons why our simulations might predict positive transfer
payments while reported benefits are zero. First, the simulations may cor-
rectly predict eligibility, but the individual may choose not to participate in
the program. Second, the individual may choose to participate in the program
but not to report transfer income. Finally, the simulation may inaccurately
predict eligibility. Thus, it is clear that the case (Sim > 0, Actual = 0) does
not necessarily indicate an error in the simulation procedure. In contrast, the
simulation is in error in all cases where it indicates that no eligibility occurs
and the data indicate that the individual received the program (Sim = 0, Ac-
tual > 0). Table 6D. I indicates a range for the number ofcorrectly classified226 Rebecca M. Blank and Maria J. Hanratty
individuals, where the minimum is the share ofcases in which both the simu-
lated and actual data agree, and the maximum is that share plus the share in
which the simulation shows eligibility but the actual data shows no receipt.
The simulation accuracies shown in the table are quite good. For the VI
programs in both countries, the simulation classifies between 85 and 95 per-
cent of the cases correctly. For the other programs, the range ofcorrect esti-
mates falls almost entirely within the 90th percentile. Not surprisingly, the
program with the lowest error in eligibility classification (and in benefit levels)
is the Canadian FA program, which has the simplest set ofnational rules.
The simulated and reported benefit payment levels are very close for the
food stamp program in the Vnited States and for the FA program in Canada.
For other programs, the simulation consistently underpredicts benefit pay-
ments. In the case ofVI, there appears to be no particular pattern to this ben-
efit underprediction across groups, and it probably reflects the fact that bene-
fits are being estimated from wages reported during 1986, which, as noted
above, are probably underestimates of base period wages. In the case of
AFDC, the undercount is concentrated among married couples with children.
This may in part be due to the fact that the reported AFDC income category
in the CPS includes some other sources of public assistance income (such as
foster-care payments) that are more likely to be received by married couples.
SA benefits are most seriously underestimated, with reported benefits double
the simulated benefits. Among single parents, the SA estimates are fairly ac-
curate. The major errors arise in the estimated SA benefits among single in-
dividuals and married couples without children. We suspect that this may be-
cause we incorrectly classify individuals as employable who in fact would be
classified as unemployable.
In any case, the results in this table are generally reassuring. They indicate
that the simulation results are reasonable and not too different from the re-
ported data. The eligibility estimates appear to be quite good, while the ben-
efit estimates somewhat underestimate actual receipt.
Appendix E
Adjustingfor Labor Supply Changes and
Program Participation
The following is a brief outline of the methodology used to adjust for labor
supply changes and incomplete program participation, in simulating the im-
pact ofadopting the mean Canadian program in the Vnited States. We present
separate methods for the case where a family receives VI and for the case
where they receive non-VI programs. A family is assumed to receive VI only
when their total income from VI would exceed that available under SA or VI.227 Comparison ofSocial Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
Non-VI Case
Determining Program Parameters
We use the simulation methodology described in appendix C to characterize
the potential transfer income received by each household under both the U.S.
and Canadian systems, in terms ofthe following equation:
B = G - tY,
where B is total transfer income, G is the guaranteed income at zero earnings,
Y is total earnings, and t is the tax rate on earnings.
The values of Band t will vary depending on the family's earnings. For
example, a family with income greater than the break-even income level of
GIt will have a guarantee and a tax rate ofzero.
For existing U.S. programs, we can use the observed earnings level ofeach
family to determine which values of G and t apply to them. For Canadian
programs, we compute possible values ofG and t, both in the case where the
family participates and where they do not participate in SA. We then use the
procedure described next to determine which budget segment they will select.
Determining Program Participation
Opting-in Income. Some families who have incomes above the break-even
level Glt under the more generous Canadian system may reduce their income
in order to qualify for assistance. A family will choose to participate in the
program as long as the additional nonwage income received from the transfer
program is enough to compensate them for the loss in utility from the higher
tax rate on earnings imposed by the transfer program. Ashenfelter (1978) has
derived the income level at which families will decide to enter the program,
by using a Taylor series approximation of the expenditure function for pro-
gram participants around the nonparticipant equilibrium. We use these equa-
tions to determine the opting-in income level:
and
YOPT = {G - tN}/{t(1 - .5te)} (one worker),
(two workers),
where G is the guarantee; t is the tax rate; N is nonlabor, nonwelfare income;
e, ell' and e22 are compensated elasticities of substitution; and 8 1 and 8 2 are
the shares of total wages received by the husband and wife in total family
earnings. (We assume cross-elasticities are zero in this case.)
Adjustment/or Incomplete Participation. To estimate the impact ofU.S. pro-
grams under incomplete participation, we assume that a family is a program
participant only if they report that they receive transfer income in the micro-228 Rebecca M. Blank and Maria J. Hanratty
data. For the EITC, where we have no information available on participation
in the microdata, we randomly assign a fraction of the population to partici-
pant status. We assume that the total participation rate for this program is the
same as reported for the Canadian CTC in table 6.6.
To estimate the impact of implementing Canadian programs in the United
States, we assume that the U.S. participation rate for each program will be the
same as reported for Canada in table 6.6. In addition, we assume that families
who indicate that they participate in U.S. programs will be more likely to
participate in comparable Canadian programs. Thus, ifa family reports that it
participates in the U.S. UI program, we assume that it will also participate in
the Canadian VI program. Ifit participates in the U.S. AFDC program or ifit
is a family without children and it participates in food stamps, we assume that
it participates in SA. We then randomly assign some ofthe remaining families
who are eligible for Canadian programs to participant status, in order to rec-
oncile the U.S. participation rates with the participation rates reported for
Canada in table 6.6.44
Determining Labor Supply Response, Given Participation Status
Slutsky Equations. Above we derive the values of each family's guarantee
level and tax rate under both the U.S. and the Canadian systems. We then
compute the implied change in labor supply using the Slutsky decomposition:
%~Hours = e (%~Wage) + b (%~Income)
= e(tl - t2)/(1 - tl ) + b{H(tl - t2)W + (G2 - G1)}/Y,
where e is the compensated elasticity of substitution; b is the income elastic-
ity; tl and t2 are the tax rates and guarantee under the U.S. and Canadian
systems, respectively; G1 and G2 are the guarantees under the U.S. and Cana-
dian systems; H, Y, and Ware hours, total income, and the wage rate under
the U.S. system. In the two-worker case this generalizes to
%~Hoursi = elt) - t2)/(1 - tl ) + bJHh(tl - t2)Wh +
Hw(t l - t2)Ww+ (G2 - G1)}/Y, i = h,w,
where hand w index the husband and wife. Note that we again assume cross-
elasticities are zero.
Labor Supply Elasticities. We use a range ofestimates of income and substi-
tution elasticities from the Seattle-Denver negative income tax experiment.
We use the minimum, mean and maximum income and substitution elastici-
ties reported in Keeley (1981). For male heads, these elasticities are
44. For the case of married couples with children, the participation rate is actually higher for
AFDC than for SA. Thus, we randomly assign a fraction of those who report AFDC income to
nonparticipant status under the SA program.229 Comparison of Social Safety Nets in Canada and the U.S.
(.04, - .14), (.12, - .21), and (.30, - .30); for wives they are (.18, - .14),
(.24, - .24) and (.67, - .77); and for female heads they are (.07, - .13),
(.17, - .24), and (.36, - .80).
VI Case
For the case where a family member is eligible for VI under either the V.S.
or the Canadian program, we characterize their potential VI benefits in terms
of the benefit replacement rate (weekly VI payment over the weekly wage)
and the maximum weeks of VI payments. We then apply results from Katz
and Meyer (1990) and from Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) that estimate the
impact ofthese two parameters on the duration ofunemployment.
Katz and Meyer estimate that a 10 percent increase in the benefit replace-
ment rate will increase mean unemployment duration by 1.5 weeks, while
Moffitt and Nicholson estimate an increase of 1.0 weeks for males and 0.8
weeks for females. The estimated impact of a l:...week increase in maximum
duration ofVI is 0.2 weeks for Katz and Meyer and 0.1 weeks for Moffitt and
Nicholson. Note that this approach considers the impact of the VI program
only on the duration ofunemployment spells. It does not account for the im-
pact of VI on the rate at which individuals enter unemployment, or for its
impact on the rate at which individuals move from out of the labor force to
employment.
This approach is not entirely satisfactory, since it does not integrate the VI
program with other transfer programs. We also tried an approach that para-
meterized the VI program as a means-tested program with a guarantee equal
to the VI payment, and a tax rate of 100 percent (on the unemployed worker),
and then applied the methodology described for the non-VI case. This ap-
proach did not yield substantially different results, so we do not report them
here.
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